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MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION-AN ADVENTURE
IN FEDERALISM
VAL SANFORD*

I.
By virtue of the nature of our federal system every attempt to regulate extensive economic activity involves constantly recurring problems as to the proper allocation of governmental power between the
state and national governments, and thus problems as to the proper
balancing of local or state and national interests. The development of
motor carrier regulation in the United States has been controlled by
the general concepts of federalism and exemplifies the nature of the
basic problems inherent in those concepts. The purpose of this article
is to examine the regulation of motor carriers from the standpoint of
the allocation of governmental powers and to offer some tentative conclusions as to the effectiveness of the present system of regulation in
this regard.
II.
The third clause of section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the
United States provides that the Congress shall have the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." By virtue of the doctrine of federal supremacy, this clause not only serves as a grant of federal power;
it also, of necessity, reduces the power of the states in the exercise of
powers otherwise belonging to them. Even in the absence of congressional action, state laws may be held invalid as in violation of this
clause.' The purpose of the clause was to promote a system of free
trade among the states and to prevent the states from disrupting or
obstructing that system.
The commerce clause does not, however, prohibit all action by the
states affecting interstate commerce. It has always been recognized
that the states have the power to govern their own local commerce,2
even though interstate commerce may be affected thereby. The problem has been to achieve a practical adjustment between the maintenance of free commerce, except insofar as Congress may regulate it,

and the maintenance of efficient state and local governments. 3
In attempting to achieve this practical adjustment the Supreme
* Lawyer, Nashville, Tennessee. Member, Tennessee Bar.
1. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2. License Cases, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 504, 574 (1847).
3. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 400 (1913).
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Court has from time to time devised and used various expressions of
the guiding standards. 4 The landmark case, however, is still Cooley v.
Board of Wardens,5 where the court said,
Now, the power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing
not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their
nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating
equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some,
like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity
which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of
the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is
really applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan or
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for
the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain ....

[T]he nature of this sub-

ject is such, that until Congress should find it necessary to assert its
power, it should be left to the legislation of the states; that it is local
and not national; that it is likely to be the best provided for, not by one
system, or plan of regulation, but by as many as the legislative discretion
of the several states should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of
6
the ports within their limits.

The problem is generally considered as one of balancing state interests against national interests. State laws will be upheld in the
absence of a requirement of national uniformity or of congressional occupation of the field, unless the state law obstructs or discriminates
7
against interstate commerce.
Where Congress has acted, however, state laws which conflict either
with the express provisions or with the congressional policies will be
held invalid.8 In this regard, however, congressional intent to displace
local laws is not, in general, to be inferred unless clearly indicated by
consideration of the statutory purposes. 9 As Justice Murphy said,
however, in Californiav. Zook, 10
But whether Congress has or has not expressed itself, the fundamental

inquiry, broadly stated, is the same: Does the state action conflict with
national policy? The Cooley rule and its later application, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, the question of congressional "occupation of
the field," of the search for conflict in the very terms of state and federal
statutes are but three separate particularizations of this initial principle.1
4. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937).
5. 53 U. S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).

6. Id. at 319.
7. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950);

Southern Pacific Ry. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (1945).
8. Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946:
Ten Years of Federalism,60 HARV. L. REV. 262 (1946).
9. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, 614 (1940).

10. 336 U. S. 725 (1949).
11. Id. at 729.
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Congress may unquestionably redefine the areas of state and national
control, and if it chooses, confer upon the states powers which they
2
otherwise would not have.'
These basic principles have controlled the distribution of governmental powers in the development of the regulation of motor carriers.
Thus, even in the absence of congressional action, the states have no
power to prohibit the operation of interstate carriers on the ground
that existing services are adequate and that there is no public convenience and necessity for additional service. 13 But in the absence of
congressional action, the states may regulate the sizes and weights of
interstate vehicles, 14 and otherwise adopt uniform laws and regulations
to promote safety of the highways, 15 to conserve the highways, 16 to
exact reasonable fees as compensation for the use of such highways, 7
to control the routes used by interstate carriers, 18 to require adequate
insurance for the protection of the general public, 19 and to regulate the
hours of employment for operators of motor vehicles. 20
With the adoption of the Federal Motor Carrier Act in 1935,21 Congress redefined the areas of national and state control. The reach of
both state and national powers in the field of motor carrier regulation
thus now turns primarily upon that act and its subsequent mnendments.
III.
Motor transportation did not enter the field of intercity operations
until approximately 1920. By the early 1930's, however, it had become
a major feature in the nation's transportation system. This initial
growth was accomplished with no federal and little effective state
control32 Between 1929 and 1933, however, most of the states enacted
comprehensive acts regulating motor carriers. By 1935, 47 states regulated common carriers of passengers, 42 regulated common carriers of
property, 31 regulated contract carriers of property and 8 regulated
private carriers of property.2
12. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946).

13. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925).
14.

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177

(1938).

15. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915).
16. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 (1932).
17. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1928).
18. Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm., 289 U. S. 92 (1933).
19. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 172 (1928). The states cannot, however, require insurance or bonds for the protection of interstate passengers
or cargo. Continental Casualty Co. v. Shankel, 88 F. 2d 819 (10th Cir. 1937).
20. H. P. Welch & Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 (1939).
21. Part II of Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended
49 U. S. C. §§ 301-327 (1952).
22. FEDERAL CO-ORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, REGULATION or TRANSPORTATION AGENcIEs REP. 13 (1934).

23. S. REP. No. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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While there was considerable variation in the state laws, there was
a marked tendency towards certain standard features. Both carriers of
passengers and property were regulated. Carriers were divided into
common, contract and private, with the latter generally being exempt.
Exemptions were generally made as to carriers operating within corporate limits, as to school busses, government vehicles, occasional
operations, and as to carriers of certain products, primarily agricultural. Certificates of convenience and necessity were required for
common carriers and permits for contract carriers. The granting of
operating authority was based upon consideration of the carrier's fitness and ability, on the effect on the highways, on the effect on existing carriers, and on consideration of the public interest or need. The
abandonment and transfer of operating authority was controlled by
the regulatory agency, which also had the power to revoke or suspend
such authority. The regulatory agency had general powers of supervision and inspection, as well as the power to pass on complaints and
to make rules and regulations. Rates and charges, facilities and services, financial responsibility and accounts and records were regulated.
in the same
Generally, the regulation of motor carriers was placed
24
agency which regulated railroads and public utilities.
In 1934, Joseph B. Eastman, the Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation, submitted to Congress a comprehensive report on the regulation
of transportation agencies. 25 He found that while the regulation of
passenger carriers by the states was generally regarded as relatively
successful, the regulation of motor freight carriers left much to be
desired.2 Such regulation was said to be characterized by considerable instability, by a lack of uniformity, and by marked differences in
the results achieved. 27 The chief problems in both fields, however,
stemmed from the difficulty in policing unauthorized operations and
the inability to regulate effectively interstate carriers. 28
As early as 1910 bills had been introduced in Congress for the regulation of motor transportation. 29 After the Supreme Court's decision
in Buck v. Kuykendal30 in 1925, which in effect precluded the effective
regulation of interstate carriers by the states, many bills were introduced in Congress in an effort to provide federal regulation. 31 A number of exhaustive studies were made and extensive hearings were held.
Finally, as a result of the conditions prevailing in the industry, and
24. FEDERAL CO-ORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION,
PORTATION AGENcIEs REP., TABLE VII (1934).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Ibid.
Id. at 191.
Ibid.
Id. at 192.

H.R.

REP. 5176, 61st CONG., 1st SESS. (1909).
267 U. S. 307 (1925).
S. REP. No. 282, 74th CONG., 1st SESS. (1935).
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upon the urging of many interested persons and groups, including the
National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, 32 Congress passed the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, providing for the
regulation of motor carriers by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
This act was based upon a proposal made by the Federal Co-Ordinator
of Transportation, which in turn was based to a large extent upon a
proposal made by the National Association of Railroad and Utilities
Commissioners.3 The act declared the policy of Congress to be
to regulate transportation by motor carriers in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, and foster sound economic
conditions in, such transportation and among such carriers in the public interest; promote adequate, economical, and efficient service by motor carriers, and reasonable charges therefor, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, and unfair or destructive competitive
practices; improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by
and regulation of, motor carriers and other carriers; develop and preserve
a highway transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the
commerce of the United States and of the national defense; and cooperate
with the several States and duly authorized officials thereof and with any
organization of motor carriers in the administration and enforcement of
this part.3 4
...

In general, the system of regulation prevailing in the states was followed. Both carriers of passengers and property were regulated. Carriers were divided into common, contract and private. Common and
contract carriers were required to obtain operating authority from the
Commission, and the Commission was given the usual regulatory
powers.
From the standpoint of the allocation of state and national power,
the most significant feature of the act is the care taken to preserve the
powers of the states. Congress not only did not assume to occupy the
entire field of motor carrier regulation, but on the contrary, by express
language, left certain areas within the control of the states.3 5 First,
the act provided that it applied
... to the transportation of passengers or property by motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and to the procurement of and
the provision of facilities for such transportation, and the regulation of
such transportation, and of the procurement thereof and the provision of
facilities therefor, is hereby vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission.36
32. Report, op. cit. supra note 22 at 25.
33. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310 U. S. 534 (1940); Report,
op. cit. supra note 22 at 25.
34. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U. S. C. § 301 (1951).
35. Tucker v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 40 F. Supp. 383, 385 (N.D. Ga.
1941).
36. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1952).
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. commerce between any

place in a State and any place in another State or between places in
the same State through another State ....
,,s7
It was expressly provided
that nothing in the act should be construed,
...to affect the powers of taxation of the several States or to authorize
a motor carrier to do an intrastate business on the highways of any State,
or to interfere with the exclusive exercise by each State of the power of
regulation of intrastate commerce by motor carriers on the highways
3
thereof. 8

Except for the provisions relating to qualifications and maximum
hours of service of employees and safety of operations or standards of
equipment, the iransportation of property or passengers within a
municipality or contiguous municipalities or within commercial zones
was generally exempt from the act.39

By virtue of a proviso to the general requirement that common carriers obtain certificates of convenience and necessity from the Inter-

state Commerce Commission, carriers operating wholly within a single
state under certificates granted by state authorities were not required
to obtain certificates from the Interstate Commerce Commission,
40
though such carriers were otherwise subject to the act.
Provision was made for the reference to joint boards, composed of
representatives of the state agencies, of the initial decision of a num4
ber of matters. '
In 1940 the act was amended to empower the Commission to issue
certificates of exemption to carriers lawfully engaged in operations in
a single state when such operations were not of such a character,
nature or quantity as substantially to affect or impair uniform regula42
tion by the Commission in interstate or foreign commerce.
The provision of the act in this regard thus gave effect to the ideas
that any federal regulation should build on the experience of the
states, should give the states the needed support in carrying out their
own regulations, 43 and should provide for the full utilization of state
cooperation in order to reduce the force of federal agents which would
otherwise be necessary." The presence of these provisions has not,
however, eliminated the recurrence of problems and litigation as to the
respective powers of the state and national governments in this field.
37. 49 Stat. 544 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (10) (1952).
38. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1952).
39. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (8) (1952).
40. 49 Stat. 551 (1935), 47 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1) (1952).
41. 49 Stat. 548 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 305 (1952).
42. 54 Stat. 921 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (4a) (1952).
43. Report,op. cit. supra,note 22 at 24.
44. Report, op. cit. supra, note 22 at 30.

1958]

MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION

IV.
The fundamental basis for dividing state and national responsibility
and authority in the regulation of economic activities is the distinction
between interstate and intrastate commerce. Despite the presence of
the congressional definition and of a host of precedents, the distinction
continues to present problems in the regulation of motor carriers since
in many instances the line to be drawn is a fine one.
A good statement of the guiding general principles is contained in
the opinion of the Interstate Commerce Comnmission in Determination of Jurisdiction of Transportation of Petroleum and Petroleum
Products by Motor Carrierin a Single State; Ex ParteNo. MC-48. 45 In
that proceeding, the Commission was confronted with the question as
to whether petroleum products which moved by pipeline and barge to
terminals were moved in interstate or intrastate commerce from the
terminal to points in the same state. In holding that such movements
were in intrastate commerce, the Commission first stated that the determinative feature was the essential character of the commerce, and
not its external form. In determining that essential character, the
Commission said that the most important feature was the fixed and
persisting transportation intent of the shipper at the time of the shipment. It found that the major manifestations of the intent, or the
absence thereof, on the facts before it appeared in the following
factors: (1) at the time of the shipment there was no specific order
being filled for a specific quantity of a given product to be moved
through to a specific destination beyond the terminal storage; (2) the
terminal storage was a distribution point or local marketing facility
from which specific amounts of the product were sold or allocated; and
(3) transportation in furtherance of such distribution within a single
state was specifically arranged only after sale or allocation from
storage. The continuity of the transportation was thus held to have
been broken. The initial shipments were held to have come to rest and
the interstate jurisdiction to have ended at the terminals. The Commission also pointed out that other factors might be considered such
as commingling in transit or in storage, processing before reshipment,
the form of the bill of lading used, and the rate of turnover at the
terminals.
The question frequently arises in connection with the application of
rates. The states fix or approve intrastate motor carrier rates and the
Interstate Commerce Commission regulates interstate motor carrier
rates. Often attempts are made to evade a through interstate rate by
use of a combination of intrastate and interstate routes to and from a
reshipping point which would result in lower aggregate charges. In
45. 71 M.C.C. 17 (1957).
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such cases, the controlling factors are, as indicated above, "the persistent and continuing shipper intent" and the nature of any reship46
ment or change in the mode of transportation.
The question also arises in connection with the transportation,
wholly within a single state by motor carrier, of property which had
a prior movement by private or exempt carrier from without the state.
Generally such transportation, even though it is in interstate commerce in the broad sense is held not to be such interstate commerce
47
as Congress has regulated under the Motor Carrier Act.

Despite the provision of the act including within the definition of
interstate commerce, commerce between places in the same state
through another state, the nature of such commerce is still on occasion questioned. In general, such commerce is held to be interstate.48
However, if the movement across state lines is not in good faith, but
is a mere subterfuge made in an effort to escape state regulation of
intrastate commerce, it may be deemed intrastate in character and
49
thus subject to the state's control.
The distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce is inherent in the commerce clause and in the American concept of federalism, and is thus of necessity the basis for allocating national and
state responsibility in the regulation of motor carriers. Congress might
extend the reach of national power in this field to include all matters
affecting interstate commerce and thus in effect pre-empt the entire
field. Congress has not, however, chosen to do so. The limits of state
and national power in this field must therefore be determined in accordance first, with the general principles governing the distinction
between interstate and intrastate commerce, and second, by reference
to the particular statutory provisions involved.
V.
In most aspects of motor carrier regulation the line between federal
and state authority corresponds to the line between interstate and
intrastate commerce. Such is generally the situation with respect to
the power to authorize or prohibit operations. The federal act 50 ex46. Compare Crude Talc. California Mines, 44 M.C.C. 714 (Div. 2 1945) with

William E. Rush, Common Carrier Application, 17 M.C.C. 661 (Div. 5 1939).

47. W. J. Holiday & Co., 53 M.C.C. 22 (Div. 2 1951); Iron & Steel Articles,
M.C.C. 769 (Div. 2 1951). But cf. Joe Dora, Motor Car-

Central Territory, 53

rier Operations within Arizona, 48 M.C.C. 171 (Div. 5 1948).
48. Central Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Meaney, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); Dohrn
Transfer Co. v. Hoegh, 116 F. Supp. 177 (D. Iowa 1953); Service Storage &
Transfer Co., Declaratory Order, 71 M.C.C. 304 (Div. 1 1957).
49. Eichholz v. Public Service Comm., 306 U.S. 268 (1939); Clark v. Public
Service Comm., 209 Md. 121, 120 A:2d 363 (1956). Compare Atlantic Freight
Lines v. Public Utility Comm., 163 Pa. Super. 215, 60 A.2d 589 (1948), cert.

denied 336 U.S. 925, with Atlantic Freight Lines, 51 M.C.C. 175 (Div. 5 1949).

50. In 54 Stat. 919 (1940), Congress changed the name of the applicable
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cludes intrastate operations from its scope. 51 The states on the other
hand have no power to authorize or prohibit interstate operations on
grounds of public convenience and necessity.5 2 The Federal Motor
Carrier Act, however, does not supersede state statutes requiring the
registration of motor vehicles. 3 Nor does it preclude the states from
requiring interstate carriers to register their interstate authority and
to obtain permits from the states for operations therein.54 Where the
carrier has authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission, however, the granting of such permits cannot involve the exercise of any
discretionary power and in effect can be nothing more than a registration of the interstate authority.55
Clearly, the states have no power to prohibit a carrier authorized by
the Interstate Commerce Commission from operating through or in the
state in interstate commerce, even though the carrier has been repeatedly found guilty of violating state laws.58 Where, however, the
carrier has no authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the state may impose punitive sanctions against the carrier, including
the revocation of any interstate permit theretofore issued to the
57
carrier.
statute from "Motor Carrier Act, 1935" to "Part II of the Interstate Commerce

Act."
51. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1952).
52. Dohrn Transfer Co. v. Hoegh, 116 F. Supp. 177 (D. Iowa 1953); Cf. Atcheson, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. v. Chicago, 240 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1957).
53. People v. Learned, 305 N.Y. 495, 114 N.E.2d 9 (1953).
54. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157 (1952); Apger v. N.Y. Cent. R.R.,
310 Mass. 495, 38 N.E. 2d 652 (1941). In Fry, Arkansas was held to have the
power: (1) to determine if a carrier in interstate commerce was a private
or a contract carrier, (2) upon a finding that it was a contract carrier to require it to obtain a permit from the state, and (3) to convict and punish for
failure to obtain such a permit. In Apger an interstate carrier which had
failed to obtain a state permit was held to be illegally operating on the highways and was accordingly denied recovery in an action arising out of a railroad crossing accident.
55. Railroad Commission v. Querner, 150 Tex. 490, 242 S.W.2d 166 (1951);
and see Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 161 (1952); Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 63 (1954). In Castle the court, speaking through
Justice Black in a unanimous decision said, at page 63, "No power at all was
left in states to determine what carriers could or could not operate in interstate commerce."
56. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, supra note 55. In this case, a carrier certified by the Interstate Commerce Commission had: been found guilty of
repeated violations of the state weight law, and the state commission had accordingly suspended the carrier's rights to use the state's highways. The
court held that such a suspension was beyond the state's powers. In Railroad
Commission v. Querner, supra note 55, a carrier had been issued a certificate
by the Interstate Commerce Commission and a permit by the state commission
to engage in interstate commerce. The carrier had been found guilty of repeatedly violating the state statute by handling intrastate commerce without
authority, and the state commission accordingly sought to prohibit the carrier's use of the state highways on this ground. The court here held that the
state had no power to cancel the carrier's state permit on such grounds or to
prohibit the carrier's operations in interstate commerce.
57. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, supra note 54; Eichholz v. Public Service
Comm. 306 U.S. 268 (1939). In Eichholz, the carrier had, prior to the passage
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While the states may not revoke or suspend the authority of carriers certified by the Interstate Commerce Commission to operate in
interstate commerce, they may unquestionably impose uniform criminal sanctions against such carriers for violating state safety or weight
laws.58 The Interstate Commerce Commission, however, can revoke
or suspend an interstate carrier's operating authority for violation of
state laws.59 It has also been held that a state has no power to construe a certificate granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission or
to punish a carrier for operating in violation thereof. 60 Nor can a state
require carriers to be chartered by the state as a prerequisite to operations therein, even in intrastate commerce, in the face of an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission approving the acquisition of the
61
intrastate certificate by an interstate carrier.
While the states generally cannot authorize or prohibit interstate
operations, they can prescribe the particular routes or highways to be
used by interstate carriers on considerations of the safety of the highways and of the public traveling thereon, 62 so long as such regulations
are reasonable. 63
The Motor Carrier Act expressly confers upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to establish reasonable requirements
with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of emof the Federal Motor Carrier Act, obtained a permit from the Missouri Commission authorizing operations in interstate commerce. Upon the passage of
the federal act, the carrier had applied for a "grandfather" certificate from
the Interstate Commerce Commission, but the application had not been acted
upon at the time of the decision in that case. The carrier had no intrastate
authority in Missouri. The Missouri commission had found the carrier to be
guilty of repeated operations in intrastate commerce and had revoked its
interstate permit on this ground. The carrier had brought suit to restrain the
state commission from enforcing its order of revocation. In denying relief to
the carrier, the court held that the state commission could validly revoke
the carrier's permit under the facts before it. The distinction between cases
involving state action against carriers having authority from the Interstate
Commerce Commission and those having no such authority is clearly drawn
in RailroadComm. v. Querner,supra,note 55.
58. See, Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 64 (1954).
59. Public Utilities Comm., 72 M.C.C. 659 (1957); and see, Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 65 (1954). But cf. Hyman Rubin & David Greenfield, 33 M.C.C. 383 (Div. 5 1942).
60. Andrew G. Nelson, Inc. v. Jessup, 134 F. Supp. 221 (D. Ind. 1955). Here
the carrier held a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission and
a comparable permit from the state. State officers had arrested the carrier's
drivers for carrying commodities not authorized by the state permit. The
carrier sued for an injunction against the state officials which was granted.
The court said that the state officials had no power to interpret the interstate
authority; and that the exclusive jurisdiction of any such complaints was in
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
61. New England Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Powers, 108 F. Supp. 953 (D.R.I.
1952); accord, Seaboard R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118, (1948); Kansas City
Southern Ry. v. Daniel, 180 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1950).
62. See, Gulf Coast Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 35 F. Supp,
136, 137 (D. Tex. 1940).
63. Associated Transport, Inc. v. Syracuse, 196 Misc. 1031, 93 N.Y.S.2d 423
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
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ployees and safety of operations and equipment. 64 In so doing, however,
Congress clearly did not pre-empt the entire field of highway safety,
and interstate carriers must obey state traffic and safety laws.65 Where,
however, the Commission has prescribed a specific safety regulation,
that regulation will supersede any conflicting state law. 6 The states
may prescribe additional qualifications not in conflict with regulations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for drivers of motor vehicles
for carriers, at least where there is a definite local interest involved, as
in the case of taxicabs operating in a border area.6 7 State safety laws
in order to be valid must not, however, impose any unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.68
The Motor Carrier Act makes no provision for the regulation of sizes
and weights of motor vehicles by the Interstate Commerce Conunission. By directing the Commission to investigate and report on the
need for federal regulation in this area, Congress indicated an intent
that the power to regulate this feature of motor carrier activity should
remain in the states.69
The same general principles are applicable in the other areas of
motor carrier regulation. For example, with respect to insurance required of carriers in interstate commerce, Congress has empowered the
Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe regulations governing
surety bonds, insurance policies and qualifications as self-insurors for
the protection of the public in both personal injury and property
damage claims,70 and the federal regulations have been held to have
7
superseded any conflicting state regulations. 1
Some cases have, however, made a distinction between insurance
requirements with respect to passengers and property moving in inter64. 49 Stat. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1-3)

provision applies to private carriers of property.

(1951).

Notice that this

65. H. P. Welch & Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939).

The Court

here held that the mere grant of power to the Interstate Commerce Commission would not supersede state laws, rather they were superseded only when
that grant was implemented by appropriate regulations.
66. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Board of Standards, 5 Misc. 2d 100,
158 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1956); cf. Watson Bros. Transfer Co. v. Omaha,
132 F. Supp. 6 (D. Neb. 1955).
67. Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952).

68. Compare Navajo Freight Lines v. Bibb, 159 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Ill. 1958),
where an Illinois statute requiring certain specific types of mud flaps was
held to impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, with
Tom's Express, Inc. v. Division of State Highway Patrol, 105 F. Supp. 916
(S.D. Ohio 1952), where a general requirement for mud flaps on certain
vehicles was upheld.
69. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); Lattavo Bros. v. Hudock, 119
F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 910 (1954).
70. 49 Stat. 557 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 315 (1951).

71. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'rs, 107 F.
Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1952); University Overland Express, Inc. v. Alson, 122
Conn. 275, 189 Atl. 458 (1936); University Overland Express, Inc. v. Griffin,
89 N.H. 295, 200 Atl. 390 (1938); cf. New York, New Haven & Hartford 1t.R.

v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 (1953).
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state commerce and insurance requirements for the protection of the
general public, and while recognizing that the federal regulations are
controlling with respect to the former, have held that state laws and
regulations can be relied upon with respect to the latter, particularly
where the carrier is authorized to operate both in interstate and in
72
intrastate commerce.
Congress has also required all interstate motor carriers to file with
the board of each state in which they operate a designation of an agent
for the service of process by or under the authority of any court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter, ". . . in any proceeding at law or in
equity brought against such carriers. '73 Despite the breadth of
language used the courts have held that the section is limited to proceedings arising under or in connection with the activities of the
carriers in interstate transportation; 74 and that the procedure thereby
made available is not exclusive of state procedures, but rather is
75
cumulative.
The issuance of securities by common and contract carriers in interstate commerce is controlled by the Interstate Commerce Act.7 6 Exception is made, however, as to motor carriers where the par value of
the securities issued or to be issued does not exceed a certain amount
and also as to certain notes. It has been held that the states have the
power to regulate the issuance of securities which come within the
77
exceptions made by Congress.
In the field of rate regulation, the Interstate Commerce Commission
has exclusive and paramount jurisdiction to regulate the rates of all
interstate motor carriers,7 8 while the states retain jurisdiction to regulate rates of intrastate motor carriers. In this connection it should be
noted that while the Interstate Commerce Commission has certain
72. Acme Fast Freight Lines, Inc. v. Blackmon, 131 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942);
Tucker v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 40 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1941);
'Boyles v. Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 706 (D. Kan. 1948);
Be-Mac Transport Co. v. Lairmore, 191 Okla. 249, 129 P.2d 192 (1942). In these
cases state laws allowing actions to be brought directly against the company
insuring the carrier were applied, rather than the federal law which in
effect requires a prior judgment against the motor carrier. In Acme, the
carrier had both interstate and intrastate authority, but the court held that
the state law could be relied upon whether or not the particular vehicle was
engaged in intrastate commerce at the time of the events giving rise to the
action.
73. 49 Stat. 563 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 321(c) (1952).
74. Madden v. Truckaway Corp., 46 F. Supp. 702 (D. Minn. 1942).
75. Esperti v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 263 App. Div. 46, 31 N.Y.S. 253
(1941); Huber v. Wilson, 23 Tenn. App. 109, 126 S.W.2d 893 (1938). Contra,
Kuris v. Pepper Poultry Co., 174 Misc. 801, 21 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1940). As to the
effect of § 321(c) on venue, see Davies v. Mahanes, 183 F.2d 671 (4th Cir.
1950); and Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 815, 819 (1949).
76. 49 Stat. 557 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 314 (1951).
77. People v. County Transportation Co., Inc., 303 N.Y. 391, 103 N.E.2d
421 (1952), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 961 (1952).
78. 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 314 (1952).
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powers with respect to intrastate rail rates which are found to be discriminatory, the Commission has no jurisdiction whatsoever over
intrastate motor carrier rates, even if they are deemed to discriminate
79
against interstate commerce.
Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act gives the Interstate Commerce Commission plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over the acquisition of one interstate motor carrier by another, over the unification and
merger of motor carriers, and in general, over any sort of transaction
whereby two or more carriers are brought under common control. 80
Certain transactions are expressly exempted from this provision, 81
and others have been held not to come within its terms. 82 Any transfer of an interstate certificate not within section 5, however, is subject
to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under
section 212 (b) .83 Thus where a control transaction includes the transfer of both interstate and intrastate operating rights the jurisdiction of
the Interstate Commerce Commission under section 5, extends to the
entire transaction and to all properties covered thereby including the
intrastate operating rights; and the states have no authority with
respect to such transactions. 84 No part of such a transaction, such
as the separate sale of intrastate rights, can be lawfully consummated
without the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 85 The
jurisdiction of the Commission under section 212 (b) is not, however,
exclusive and plenary to the extent it is under section 5. Thus where
the basis of the Commission's jurisdiction of a transaction is section
212 (b), and the transaction involves both interstate and intrastate
rights, while the Interstate Commerce Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction of the interstate rights, it has no jurisdiction over the
intrastate.86 Where only intrastate rights are involved, the Interstate
Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction over transfers or acquisitions.87
The general line between federal and state authority over motor
carrier regulation still corresponds to the line between interstate and
intrastate commerce. Where, however, as in section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress has specified that its regulation is to
be exclusive, no state regulation can be validly applied even to intra79. Increased Rates Pacific Northwest 1953, 63 M.C.C. 113 (Div. 2 1954).
80. 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1952); 54 Stat. 908 (1940), 49 U.S.C.

§ 5(11) (1952).
81. 54 Stat. 908 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(10) (1952).
82. E.g.. County of Marin v.United States, 356 U.S. 412 (1958).

83. 54 Stat. 924 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 312(bY (1952).
84. New England Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Powers, 108 F. Supp. 953 (D.R.I.

1952).
85. Bruce Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 39 M.C.C. 489 (Div. 4 1944).

86. County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412 (1958).
87. Industrial Transport, Inc., 37 M.C.C. 202 (Div. 4 1941).."."....
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state commerce. Where Congress specifically leaves an area of regulation to the states, as in the case of sizes and weights of motor vehicles,
state regulations can be validly applied even to interstate carriers.
But when Congress makes no specific provision, as is true in most
areas of motor carrier regulation, it is necessary to examine closely
the federal and state laws to determine the purpose of each and to
determine what each requires of the regulated activities; and if the
existence and operation of the state laws hinders or is inconsistent
with the federal program, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress
88
intended to supersede state control.
VI.

As has been indicated, one of the basic purposes of the Federal
Motor Carrier Act was the encouragement of co-operation between
federal and state agencies in the regulation of motor carriers. This
purpose is evidenced in many provisions of the act. Of particular
significance are two provisions with respect to motor carriers operating in interstate commerce wholly within a single state. Section
204 (a) (4) (a) empowers the Commission to grant certificates of
exemption to motor carriers lawfully engaged in operations in a
single state, where their activities do not substantially affect or impair
uniform regulation by the Commission of interstate carriers.89 The
second proviso of section 206 (a) (1) excluded from the general requirement that common carriers obtain a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the Interstate Commerce Commission, carriers
operating wholly in a single state under certificates granted by state
authorities, though such carriers were left otherwise subject to the
actY0
The purpose of section 204 (a) (4) (a) was to enable small local
carriers operating wholly within a single state, principally in intrastate commerce, to be relieved of the necessity of obtaining certificates or permits or otherwise complying with the Motor Carrier Act
where their interstate operations are of little consequence and have
little effect upon carriers regulated under the act.91 The language
of the section and the undoubted purpose of the act would justify an
interpretation recognizing a broad power in the Commission to grant
such exemptions. On the basis of the general principle of statutory
construction that exceptions to general remedial statutes should be
88. E.g., Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utility Comm'rs,

107 F. Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1952). It has been held, however, that coincidence
either in purpose or in detail, does not automatically mean invalidity in an
area of substantial state interest. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
89. 54 Stat. 921 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (4a) (1951).
90. 49 Stat. 551 (1935). 49 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1) (1951).
91. Eldred Winter, 32 M.C.C. 679 (Div. 5 1942).

19581

MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION

strictly construed, the Commission has, however, placed a strict and
narrow construction on this section.9 2
The Commission has held that the exemption must apply to the
entire operation of the motor carrier, and thus that there can be no
partial exemption. 93 The exemption will be denied if the carrier has
any operations in more than one state, even if such operations are
exempt from regulation under some other section of the act.9
In order to come within the exemption, the carrier must be lawfully engaged in operations in the state, and thus where state laws
require an intrastate certificate, the carrier must have such a certificate before the exemption will be granted. 95 It is not necessary for
a carrier to hold operating authority from the Interstate Commerce
Commission in order to be entitled to the exemption. The fact that
an applicant for the exemption would also be exempt under the applicable state statute will also be considered as a basis for denying the
97
exemption.
In determining whether the applicant's operations have a substantial affect on interstate transportation, the Commission has generally taken a narrow view of what is substantial. 98 It has considered
in this regard the volume of traffic in interstate commerce, 99 the affect on regulated carriers,100 the presence of joint tariffs with regulated carriers, 101 and the frequency and regularity of interstate
transportation by the applicant. 102
The second proviso to section 206 (a) (1) was based upon similar
considerations of policy and has in general been similarly construed.
The purpose of the second proviso was to exempt from the necessity
of obtaining an interstate certificate of convenience and necessity as
to commerce between points in a single state any carrier holding an
intrastate certificate to operate between such points. 10 3 The reason
for the exemption was that since such carriers have already shown
the existence of public convenience and necessity for their services
92. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 47 M.C.C. 81 (Div. 5 1947).
93. Rock Port, Langdon &Northern Ry. Co., 33 M.C.C. 315 (Div. 5 1942).
94. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 47 M.C.C. 81 (Div. 5 1947).
95. Lloyd A. Miller, 41 M.C.C. 783 (Div. 5 1943).

96. L. M. Slocum, 30 M.C.C. 169 (1941).

97. Eldred Winter, 32 M.C.C. 679 (Div. 5 1942).

98. E.g., International Ry. Co., 44 M.C.C. 789 (1945). Note here the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Allredge where he suggested that the Commission should exempt the carrier from all provisions of Part II except those
pertaining to interstate fares.
99. Stockton Motor Express, 49 M.C.C. 841 (Div. 5 1949).
100. International Ry. Co., 44"M.C.C. 789 (1945); Stockton Motor Express,
49 M.C.C. 841 (Div. 5 1949).
101. International Ry. Co., 44 M.C.C. 789 (1945); W. H. Shackelford, 34
M.C.C. 15 (Div. 5 1942).
102. International Ry. Co., 44 M.C.C. 789 (1945).
103. Gulf Coast Motor Freight Lines v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.
Tex. 1940).
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between such points, they ought not to be required to make another
such showing merely because they transport goods in both interstate
and intrastate commerce. 0 4
The early decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission were
in conflict as to the nature and effect of the proviso. In some cases
the proviso was conceived as a statutory grant of an interstate
operating right, while in other cases it was conceived as a mere exception and not a grant at all. 0 5

In the leading case on the construction of the proviso, Baggett
Trans. Co., 0 6 the full Commission held, with four members dissenting, that the proviso was a mere exception, not a grant of right, and
did not authorize a grant of right by the Commission. The majority of
the Commission reasoned that section 206 (a) states a general rule of
conduct requiring certificates of convenience and necessity from the
Commission; that the proviso is an exception to that rule; that exceptions to remedial statutes must be strictly construed; and that therefore the proviso must be strictly construed. In a vigorous dissent,
Chairman Eastman argued that the majority were ignoring the intent
of Congress; that in recognition of the interest of the states Congress
had provided that the Commission should in effect rely upon the finding of the state commissions in cases coming within the proviso; that
the state certificate was intended to be accepted as a substitute for a
federal certificate; and that carriers holding such certificates and
coming within the proviso should be recognized as motor carriers for
all purposes of the act.
In the Baggett case, the Commission also spelled out the prerequisites of the proviso: (1) the carrier must be lawfully engaged in
operations in a single state;10 7 (2) there must be a board in such state
having power to grant certificates of convenience and necessity
104. Ibid.
105. Compare Illinois Greyhound Lines, 15 M.C.C. 86 (Div. 5 1938) with
Indiana R.R., 21 M.C.C. 73 (Div. 4 1939).
106. Baggett Transp. Co., 36 M.C.C. 659 (1941).

107. The Commission has strictly construed this requirement. The Commis-

sion has held the exemption not applicable on this ground: Where an interstate carrier was merely in a position to exercise control over the intrastate
carrier through common employees or family relationship, Refrigerated
Transp., Inc., 54 M.C.C. 625 (1952); Wilson Transp. Co., 51 M.C.C. 233 (Div. 5
1950); where the carridr conducted operations in another state under the exemption provided under § 203(b) (8) dealing with operations in commercial
zones, Jet Cartage Co., 51 M.C.C. 551 (Div. 5 1950); and where the carrier's
operations in other states were under a permit as a contract carrier, Baggett
Transp. Co., 29 M.C.C. 103 (Div. 5 1941). The Commission has, however, held
the exemption to-be applicable even though the carrier operated in other
states under the agricultural exemption provided by § 203 (b) (6) on the
ground that the agricultural exemption enjoys a favored status, Peters, Application, 73 M.C.C. 331 (1957); and even though the carrier was under common
control with an interstate railroad, Monon Transp. Corp., 44 M.C.C. 325 (1945).
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authorizing intrastate operations; and (3) the carriers must have ob108
tained such a certificate from such board.
The extent of the carrier's operating authority in interstate commerce under the proviso coincides with the operating authority it
holds in intrastate commerce, 109 and to this extent the state Commission does define the limits of the carrier's authority in interstate
commerce. However, by the terms of the act, proviso carriers are
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission under part II of the Interstate Commerce Act." 0
By reason of the Commission's conception of the nature of the proviso carrier's rights to operate in interstate commerce as a mere
exempt status, such carriers, though otherwise subject to the act, are
at a distinct disadvantage. For example: (1) they cannot freely extend
their operations into other states; (2) they cannot transfer their right
to operate in interstate commerce, rather they can transfer only their
intrastate authority and the transferee thereof must requalify for the
exemption if the interstate service of the transferor is to be continued;
(3) they cannot obtain alternate routes for operating convenience
crossing state lines; and (4) since their right to operate in interstate
commerce is not secure and is not readily marketable, the value of
their operating authority is not as great as would be true of an interstate certificate.1 '
As a result of these disadvantages, proviso carriers frequently
sought certificates from the Interstate Commerce Commission duplicating their state certificates. For a time the Commission was rather
liberal in granting such applications, but in recent years the Commission has adopted a policy of refusing to grant such applications for
proviso carriers except in special circumstances." 2 The basis of the
Commission's policy has been that the granting of such certificates
made possible an undesirable duplication of operating rights." 3 In
fact, the problem of controlling the duplication of operating rights in
connection with proviso carriers has led the Commission to urge the
repeal of the proviso." 4
Conclusion
In few, if any, federal regulatory systems has Congress shown as
108. Gulf Coast Motor Freight Lines v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.

Tex. 1940); W. M. Daniels, 32 M.C.C. 585 (Div. 5 1942).

109. South Florida Freightways, Inc., 67 M.C.C. 35 (1956).
110. E.g., Renner, Investigation, 70 M.C.C. 195 (Div. 4 1956); Leo Miller, 58
M.C.C. 350 (Div. 4 1952).
111. Baggett Transp. Co., 36 M.C.C. 659 (Div. 5 1941); H. A. Day, 53 M.C.C.
672 (Div. 5 1952).
112. H. A. Day, 53 M.C.C. 672 (Div. 5 1952).

113. Ibid.
114. Hearings before Sub-Committee of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1720, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. 29 (1957).
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much consideration for local and state interests as in the regulation
of motor carriers. The overall effectiveness of the present system of
regulation involves.matters far beyond the limits of this article. Assuming, however, that the premise of cooperative federalism is sound,
and that matters which are primarily of local concern should be regulated by the states rather than by the national government, certain
conclusions appear warranted in this regard.
Any system of federal regulation will encourage mergers and large
scale operations and discourage small operations to the detriment of
local interest unless the latter are to some extent exempted from the
burdens necessary to the effective regulation of the former.11 5 On the
whole, the present system of regulation of motor carriers is satisfactory in its accommodation of state and federal interests. A more
flexible approach is needed, however, in the application of the present
exemption as contained in section 204(a) (4) (a) and in the second
proviso of section 206 (a) (1). In the application of the former section,
the basic consideration should not be so much the proportion of interstate business done by the carrier as the nature of that business, that
is, whether essentially local," 6 and whether regulation of that business
could not be effectively accomplished by the states. In this connection, provision should be made for partial exemptions under this section, for example, some carriers might be exempted except as to the
application of the rate provisions of the act. A more liberal approach
should also be taken with respect to the granting of exemptions. With
a provision for partial exemption it should be more feasible to exempt
carriers according to class than is apparently true at present.
In the application of both sections, the Commission should be less
concerned about the possible abuse through common control with
regulated carriers and more concerned about granting exemptions
when federal regulation will serve no substantial purpose.
The proviso should not be repealed, rather it should be clarified
so as to provide for the grant of a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission to carriers coming within its terms. The Commission could effectively control any undue proliferation of operating
rights under its present powers. However, it might be well to write
into the act a prohibition against the split of interstate and intrastate
operating rights. Proviso carriers should not be treated as unwanted
115. FEDERAL CO-ORDINATOR Or TRANSPORTATION, REGULATION OF TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES REP. 28 (1934); and see annual reports of Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to the trend towards larger and fewer units.

116. For example, the distribution of freight from a city distribution point
to small -towns and villages is essentially local in character, even though most
of that freight may have come to the city from outside the state. There is no
good reason to subject the little carrier operating between a city and three
or four small towns to the full burdens of regulation by the federal government.
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stepchildren, but should be fully equal to those whose rights stem from
the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In any event, the regulation of motor carriers should continue to
accommodate both the national and local interests in accordance with
the concepts of cooperative federalism.

